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Abstract—This paper considers a generalized framework to
study OSNR optimization-based end-to-end link level power
control problems in optical networks. We combine favorable
features of game-theoretical approach and central cost approach
to allow different service groups within the network. We develop
solutions concepts for both cases of empty and nonempty feasible
sets. In addition, we derive and prove the convergence of a
distributed iterative algorithm for different classes of users. In the
end, we use numerical examples to illustrate the novel framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reconfigurable optical Wavelength-Division Multiplexing
(WDM) communication networks with arbitrary topologies
are currently enabled by technological advances in optical
devices such as optical add/drop MUXes (OADM), optical
cross connects (OXC) and dynamic gain equalizer (DGE).
It is important that channel transmission performance and
quality of service (QoS) be optimized and maintained after
reconfiguration. At the physical transmission level, channel
performance and QoS are directly determined by the bit-
error rate (BER), which in turn depends on optical signal-
to-noise ratio (OSNR), dispersion and nonlinear effects, [1].
Thus, OSNR is considered as the dominant performance
parameter in link-level optimization. Conventional off-line
OSNR optimization is done by adjusting channel input power
at transmitter (Tx) to equalize the dominant impairment of
noise accumulation in chains of optical amplifiers. However,
for reconfigurable optical networks, where different channels
can travel via different optical paths, it is more desirable
to implement on-line decentralized iterative algorithms to
accomplish such adjustment.
Recently, this problem is addressed in many research
works [2],[3],[4], and two optimization-based approaches are
prevalently used: the central cost and the non-cooperative
game approach. The goals and models of the two approaches
are inherently different. Central cost approach satisfies the
target OSNR with minimum total power consumption. The
model embeds the OSNR requirements in its constraints and
indirectly optimizes a certain design criterion. Such model
yields a relatively simple closed-form solution; however, it
doesn’t optimize OSNR in a direct fashion, and thus, channel
performance can be potentially improved for users who need
higher quality of transmission. On the other hand, the game
Quanyan Zhu is with the Department of Electrical and Computer En-
gineering, University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, IL, 61801, USA
email: zhu31@illinois.edu; L. Pavel is with the Department of Electrical and
Computer Engineering, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, M5S 3L1 Canada
e-mail:pavel@control.utoronto.ca.
approach is a naturally distributed model which directly opti-
mizes OSNR based on a payoff function in a non-cooperative
manner. Each user optimizes her own utility to achieve the
best possible OSNR. The solution from this approach is given
by Nash equilibrium. As a result, this solution concept yields
best achievable OSNR levels for each user. Since the game
approach involves a cost function arising from pricing, it gives
an over-allocation of resources. Some users may wish to avoid
such cost and only demand a basic level of transmission.
Apparently, these two approaches are for two different type
of users and different transmission purposes.
To make use of the advantages from each approach, we
propose a generalized model that combines their features. Such
a generalization allows to accommodate different types of
users and also provides a novel mixed framework to study
OSNR power control problem. We separate users into two
different categories. One type of users are those who are
willing to pay a price to fully optimize their transmission
performance. Another type of users are those who are content
with basic transmission quality, or OSNR level, set by the
network. The quality of service (QoS) can be met for the
former by a game-theoretically based optimization approach;
and for the later by a mechanism similar to central cost
approach.
The contribution of this paper lies in the capability of
service differentiation of the generalized model. For simplicity,
total capacity constraints are not considered. The paper is or-
ganized as follows. In section 2, we review the network OSNR
model and the basic concepts about the two optimization-based
approaches. In section 3, we establish a general framework
and propose two solution concepts for two different cases of
feasible sets. Section 4 gives an iterative algorithm to achieve
such solutions in the framework. This is illustrated in section
5 by numerical examples. Section 6 concludes the paper and
points out future directions of research.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Review of Optical Network Model
Consider a network with a set of optical links L =
{1, 2, .., L} connecting the optical nodes, where channel
add/drop is realized. A set N = {1, 2, ..., N} of channels are
transmitted, corresponding to a set of multiplexed wavelengths.
Illustrated in Figure 1, a link l has Kl cascaded optically
amplified spans. Let Nl be the set of channels transmitted over
link l. For a channel i ∈ N , we denote by Ri its optical path,
or collection of links, from source (Tx) to destination (Rx).
Let ui be the ith channel input optical power (at Tx), and
2Fig. 1. A Typical Optical Link in DWDM Optical Networks
u = [u1, ..., uN ]
T the vector of all channels’ input powers.
Let si be the ith channel output power (at Rx), and ni the
optical noise power in the ith channel bandwidth at Rx. The
ith channel optical OSNR is defined as OSNRi = sini . In [2],
some assumptions are made to simplify the expression for
OSNR, typically for uniformly designed optical links:
1) (A1) Amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) noise
power does not participate in amplifier gain saturation.
2) (A2) All the amplifiers in a link have the same spectral
shape with the same total power target and are operated
in automatic power control mode.
Under A1 and A2, dispersion and nonlinearity are considered
to be limited, and ASE noise accumulation will be the domi-
nant impairment. The OSNR for the ith channel is given as
OSNRi =
ui
n0,i +
∑
j∈N Γi,juj
, i ∈ N (1)
where Γ is the full n× n system matrix which characterizes
the coupling between channels. n0,i denotes the ith channel
noise power at the transmitter. System matrix Γ encapsulates
the basic physics present in optical fiber transmission and
implements an abstraction from a network to an input-output
system. This approach has been used in [5] for the wireless
case to model CDMA uplink communication. Different from
the system matrix used in wireless case, the matrix Γ given
in (2) is commonly asymmetric and is more complicatedly
dependent on parameters such as spontaneous emission noise,
wavelength-dependent gain, and the path channels take.
Γi,j =
∑
i∈Ri
Kl∑
k=1
Gkl,j
Gkl,i
(
l−1∏
q=1
Tq,j
Tq,i
)
ASEl,k,i
Po,l
, ∀j ∈ Nl. (2)
where Gl,k,i is the wavelength dependent gain at kth span
in lth link for channel i; Tl,i =
∏Kl
q=1Gl,k,iLl,k with Ll,k
being the wavelength independent loss at kth span in lth link;
ASEl,k,i is the wavelength dependent spontaneous emission
noise; P0,l is the output power at each span.
B. Central Cost Approach
Similar to the SIR optimization problem in the wire-
less communication networks [6], [7], OSNR optimization
achieves the target OSNR predefined by each channel user
by allowing the minimum transmission power. Let γi, i ∈ N
be the target OSNR for each channel. By setting the OSNR
requirement as a constraint, we can arrive at the following
central cost optimization problem (CCP):
(CCP) minu
∑
i∈N ui
subject to OSNRi ≥ γi ∀i ∈ N . (3)
Under certain conditions, it has been shown in [2] that the
feasible set of (CCP) is nonempty and the optimal solution is
achievable at the boundary of the feasible set.
The formulated optimization problem can be extended to
incorporate more constraints such as
ui,min ≤ ui ≤ ui,max, (4)
where ui,min is minimum threshold power required for trans-
mission for channel i and ui,max is maximum power channel
i can attain. In the central cost approach, power ui are the
parameters to be minimized and the objective function is
linearly separable. In addition, the constraints are linearly
coupled. These nice characteristics in central cost approach
leads to a relatively simple optimization problem.
C. Non-cooperative Game Approach
Let’s review the basic game-theoretical model for power
control in optical networks without constraints. Consider a
game defined by a triplet 〈N , (Ai), (Ji)〉. N is the index
set of players or channels; Ai is the strategy set {ui | ui ∈
[ui,min, ui,max]}; and, Ji is the cost function. It is chosen in a
way that minimizing the cost is related to maximizing OSNR
level. In [3], Ji is defined as
Ji(ui, u−i) = αiui − βi ln
(
1 + ai
ui
X−i
)
, i ∈ N (5)
where αi, βi are channel specific parameters, that quantify the
willingness to pay the price and the desire to maximize its
OSNR, respectively, ai is a channel specific parameter, X−i
is defined as X−i =
∑
j 6=i Γi,juj + n0,i. This specific choice
of utility function is non-separable, nonlinear and coupled.
However, Ji is strictly convex in ui and takes a specially
designed form such that its first-order derivative is linear with
respect to u.
The solution from the game approach is usually character-
ized by Nash equilibrium (NE). Provided that ∑j 6=i Γi,j < ai,
the resulting NE solution is uniquely determined in a closed
form by
Γ˜u
∗ = b˜, (6)
where Γ˜i,j = ai, for j = i; Γ˜i,j = Γi,j , for j 6= i and
b˜ = aiβi
αi
− n0,i.
Similar to the wireless case [5], we are able to construct
iterative algorithms to achieve the Nash equilibrium. A simple
deterministic first order parallel update algorithm is:
ui(n+ 1) =
βi
αi
− 1
ai
(
1
OSNRi(n)
− Γi,i
)
ui(n). (7)
As proved in [3], the algorithm (7) converges to Nash equi-
librium u∗ provided that 1
ai
∑
j 6=i Γi,j < 1, ∀i.
III. GENERALIZED MODEL
In this section, we consider a game designed to allow
service differentiation by separating users into two groups:
one group seeking a minimum OSNR target and another group
participating in a game setting for OSNR optimization. The
minimum OSNR for target seekers is set by the network to
ensure the minimum quality of service. However, the game
3Game PlayersTarget Seeker
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Fig. 2. Game players and target seekers in the network
players can submit their parameters and optimize their service
accordingly, but they have to pay a price set by the network
for unit power consumption. This concept is illustrated in
Figure 2. Let’s denote set N1 = {1, 2, ..., N1} as the set of
competitors, i.e. users who wish to compete for an optimal
OSNR. Let set N2 = {N1+1, · · · , N2} be the group of users
with target OSNR given by γi, i ∈ N2. Let N = N1 ∪ N2,
m = |N1| = N1, n = |N2|, N = |N | = m + n and
u = [u1, · · · , uN1 , uN1+1, · · · , uN2 ]T .
For the game-theoretical players, using the cost function
given in (5), we can form a system of equations given by
aiui +X−i =
aiβi
αi
, ∀i ∈ N1
and thus, Γ˜u = b˜, where Γ˜ ∈ Rm×N and b˜ ∈ Rm are
defined as in (6). Users with target OSNR shall have u satisfy
OSNRi ≥ γi, ∀i ∈ N2, or equivalently from (1),
ui
Γi,iui +
∑
j 6=i Γi,juj + n0,i
≥ γi
and thus in a matrix form, Γ̂u ≥ b̂, where b̂ =
[γ1n0,1, · · · , γNn0,N ]T ∈ Rn, Γ̂ ∈ Rn×N and is given in
(8). Let F1 = {u ∈ RN | Γ˜u = b˜} and F2 = {u ∈ RN |
Γ̂u ≥ b̂}. In summary, we have a problem formulated as in
(DS), where we find solutions that satisfy F1 subject to the
constraint described by F2.
(DS) Γ˜u = b˜
s.t. Γ̂u ≥ b̂ (9)
In the following discussion, we separate (DS) into two
cases: (1) F = F1 ∩ F2 6= ∅, (2)F = F1 ∩ F2 = ∅, which
require different techniques to find appropriate solutions.
A. Non-empty Feasible Set
A non-empty F may give rise to multiple points that solve
(DS). We may impose some design criteria, or, objective
function to reformulate DS for finding an appropriate solution
that solves DS and meet the design criteria at the same time.
We can use the following result to ensure the nonempty
feasible set F .
Theorem 3.1: If Γ =
[
Γ˜
Γ̂
]
is nonsingular, the feasible set
F = F1 ∩ F2 is non-empty.
Proof: Let µ ∈ Rn+ a nonnegative vector. Equivalently,
we can express F2 into F2 = {u ∈ Rn | Γ̂u = b̂ +
µ, for some µ ∈ Rn+}. The set F is thus equivalently F =
{u ∈ RN | Γu = φ, for some µ ∈ Rn+}, where Γ =
[
Γ˜
Γ̂
]
and φ =
[
b˜
b̂+ µ
]
. If Γ is nonsingular, there exist a unique
u ∈ RN for every nonnegative µ. Therefore F is non-empty.
Suppose conditions in Theorem 3.1 hold and F is nonempty.
We consider an appropriate solution in F that satisfies a certain
design criteria. Thus, we formulate (DSNP1) in which we
minimize total power consumption subject to the conditions
arising from the different service requirements.
(DSNP) min∑i ui
s.t. Γ˜u = b˜, Γ̂u ≥ b̂ (10)
The constraints of (DSNP) can be relaxed and augmented
into
Γu ≥ b. (11)
where Γ =
[
Γ˜
Γ̂
]
∈ RN×N and b =
[
b˜
b̂
]
∈ RN .
According to the fundamental theorem of linear program-
ming [8], if (DSNP) is realistic, the solution is obtained at
the extreme point of the feasible set F . Since F has only one
extreme point when Γ is non-singular, the solution is uniquely
given by
u = Γ
−1
b. (12)
To further characterize the solution u, we assume strict
diagonal dominance of matrix Γ [9], which leads to non-
singularity of the matrix and uniqueness of the solution.
Theorem 3.2: Suppose OSNR targets γi, i ∈ N2 are chosen
such that γi < 1∑
j∈N
Γi,j
, i ∈ N2. In addition, parameters ai
are chosen as ai >
∑
j 6=i,j∈N Γij , ∀i ∈ N1. The matrix Γ is
strictly diagonally dominant. And thus, a unique solution to
(DSNP) is given by (12).
Proof: From the assumption that γi
∑
j∈N Γij < 1, i ∈
N2, it is apparent that γi < 1Γii and |1− γiΓii| >
γi
∑
j Γij , ∀i ∈ N2. In addition, ai >
∑
j 6=i,j∈N Γi,j , ∀i ∈
N1. Therefore, matrix Γ is strictly diagonally dominant. Using
Gershgorin theorem in [9], we conclude that there exists a
unique solution to (DSNP).
The assumption of strict diagonal dominance in Theorem
3.2 is reasonable because typical values of Γij are found to
be on the order of 10−3 and desirable levels of OSNR are
20-30dB.
Remark 3.1: (DSNP) can be seen as a generalized approach
that combines central cost approach in [2] and non-cooperative
game approach in [3]. When N1 = ∅, N2 6= ∅, (DSNP) reduces
to the central cost approach. Similarly, when N1 6= ∅, N2 = ∅,
(DSNP) reduces to the game-theoretical approach and the
given solution is Nash equilibrium accordingly. This frame-
work allows to study two different types of users at the same
time.
Remark 3.2: We illustrate a two-person (DSNP), where
player 1 chooses to compete and optimize his utility and player
1DSNP stands for “Differentiated Service N-person Problem”.
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Fig. 3. The feasible set of two-person (DSNP). s1 = b˜1a1 ; s2 =
b˜1
Γ12
2 chooses to meet a certain OSNR target γ2. We form the 2-
by-2 matrix Γ and b as follows.
Γ =
[
a1 Γ12
−Γ21γ2 1− Γ22γ2
]
,b =
[
a1β1
α1
− n0,1
n0,2γ2
]
The feasible set F = F1 ∩ F2 is shown in Figure 3 by
a dotted line. The relaxed (DSNP) has its relaxed feasible
depicted in the shaded region. The solution is given by u∗ =
Γ
−1
b, which is illustrated by the dark point in Figure 3. u∗
is nonnegative componentwise if network price α1 is set such
that s2 > n0,21−Γ22 .
Based on Theorem 3.2, we can further investigate how pa-
rameters chosen by game players and target seekers influence
the outcome of the allocation. The result is summarized in
Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 3.3: Let κ be the condition number of Γ, Ti =
ai +
∑
j 6=i,j∈N Γij , ∀i ∈ N1 and Sk = 2− 2γkΓkk, ∀k ∈ N2.
Suppose Γ is strictly diagonally dominant by satisfying condi-
tions in Theorem 3.2. In addition, Ti > Sk and b˜i > bˆk, ∀i ∈
N1, ∀k ∈ N2. The maximum allocated power allocated to
users are bound as follows.
maxi∈N2 γin0,i
maxi∈N1 2ai
≤ ‖u‖∞ ≤ κmax
i∈N1
βi
αi
Proof: Let Ri denote the i-th row absolute sum of matrix
Γ, i.e.,
Ri =
∑
j∈N
∣∣Γij ∣∣ . (13)
Using conditions from Theorem 3.2, we arrive at
Ri =
{
1 + γi
∑
j∈N Γij − 2γiΓii < 2− 2γiΓii, i ∈ N2;
ai +
∑
j 6=i,j∈N Γij < 2ai., i ∈ N1.(14)
With the assumption that ai+
∑
j 6=i Γij > 2−2γkΓkk, ∀i ∈
N1, ∀k ∈ N2, we obtain ‖Γ‖∞ = maxi∈N Ri =
maxi∈N ai+
∑
j 6=i Γij . Using (14) and the fact that Γij ≥ 0,
we obtain an upper and lower bound on ‖Γ‖∞, i.e.,
max
i∈N1
ai ≤ ‖Γ‖∞ ≤ max
i∈N1
2ai. (15)
In addition, from b˜i > bˆk, ∀i ∈ N1, ∀k ∈ N2, we obtain an
upper bound and lower bound for ‖b‖∞, given by
max
i∈N2
γin0,i ≤ ‖b‖∞ = max
i∈N
bi ≤ max
i∈N1
b˜i = max
i∈N1
aiβi
αi
(16)
Since Γ is strictly diagonally dominant, using matrix norm
sub-multiplicativity, we obtain from (12)
‖b‖∞
‖Γ‖∞
≤ ‖u‖∞ ≤ κ‖b‖∞‖Γ‖∞
, (17)
where κ is the condition number of Γ given by κ =
‖Γ‖∞‖Γ−1‖∞ ≥ 1.
Using (15), (16) and (17), we obtain
maxi∈N2 γin0,i
maxi∈N1 2ai
≤ ‖u‖∞ ≤ κmaxi∈N1 aiβi/αi
maxi∈N1 ai
≤ κmaxi∈N1 aimaxi∈N1 βi/αi
maxi∈N1 ai
≤ κmax
i∈N1
βi
αi
. (18)
It is easy to observe that the upper bound is dependent on
the parameters of the game players and the lower bound is
dependent on the OSNR levels of target seeker and parameter
ai of the game players. In essence, game players control the
outcome of the model and the choice of OSNR target can
only affect the lower bound. Such relation describes a fair
scenario in which game players, who pay for their power at
αi, have their choices of parameters ai, βi to influence the
network allocation.
Remark 3.3: Since ‖u‖∞ ≤ ‖u‖2 ≤
√
N‖u‖∞, we can
translate the result obtained in (18) directly into Euclidean
norm, i.e.,
BL∞ ≤ ‖u‖2 ≤
√
NBU∞ (19)
where BU∞ = κmaxi∈N1
βi
αi
and BL∞ =
maxi∈N2 γin0,i
maxi∈N1 2ai
.
By (19), we can see that the network can encourage uniform
channel power distribution by letting BU∞ close to
√
NBL∞ and
provide incentive for differentiated services by letting them
far apart. It can be implemented by the network by adjusting
OSNR level γi and pricing αi. Decreasing αi encourages more
users to be game players, giving rise to more competitions
or service differentiation as a result of higher upper bound.
On the other hand, increasing γi raises the lower bound and
encourages more users being target-seekers.
5B. Empty Feasible Set
In this section, we consider the second case where feasible
set F is empty. Instead of finding an appropriate feasible
solution, we find the closest points between set F1 and F2.
We use a quadratic program (DS2) to minimize the error norm
subject to the constraint described by F2.
(DS2) minu ‖Γ˜u− b˜‖2
s.t. Γ̂u ≥ b̂ (20)
We can turn the constrained problem (20) into an uncon-
strained problem by studying its corresponding dual problem.
Since ‖Γ˜u− b˜‖2 = uT Γ˜T Γ˜u− 2(b˜T Γ˜)u+ b˜T b˜, we denote
H = 12 Γ˜
T
Γ˜,d = −2(Γ˜T b˜), D = −Γ̂(HTH)−1HT Γ̂T ,
c = b̂ + Γ̂(HTH)−1HTd; and form a Lagrangian from the
original problem (DS2).
D(µ) = min
u
L(u, µ) (21)
= min
u
(
1
2
u
T
Hu+ dTu+ b˜T b˜+ µT (−Γ̂u+ b˜)
)
Since the objective function is convex, the necessary and
sufficient condition for a minimum is that the gradient must
vanish,i.e.,
Hu+ d− ΓˆTµ = 0. (22)
For n < N , Γ˜ is not full rank. Therefore, H is singular and
there exist multiple solutions to (22). Using pseudoinverse [9],
we can find a solution to (22) given by
u = −(HTH)−1HT
(
d− ΓˆTµ
)
.
Thus, after replacing into (21), we obtain µ as a solution to
the dual problem (DDS2).
(DDS2)max
µ≥0
1
2
µTDµ+ µT c− 1
2
d
T (HTH)−1HTd+ bTb
(23)
The problem (LDS2) and dual problem (DDS2) can be
solved using unconstrained optimization algorithms in [10],
[8].
IV. ITERATIVE ALGORITHM
In this section, we develop algorithm for the case of
nonempty F set. Let ui(n) denote the power at channel i
at step n. An iterative algorithm is given as follows. ui(n+ 1) =
βi
αi
− 1
ai
(
1
OSNRi(n)
− Γi,i
)
ui(n), ∀i ∈ N1;
ui(n+ 1) =
γi
1−γiΓi,i
(
1
OSNRi(n)
− Γi,i
)
ui(n), ∀i ∈ N2.
(24)
Theorem 4.1: Algorithm (24) converges provided that ai >∑
j 6=i,j∈N Γi,j and γi is chosen such that γi < 1∑
j∈N
Γi,j
.
Proof: We use a similar approach from [3] to show the
convergence of (24). Let’s define ei(n) = ui(n)−u∗i , where u∗i
is given in (12). Since Γu∗ = b, Γ˜i,iu∗i +
∑
j 6=i Γ˜i,ju
∗
j = b˜i,
for i ∈ N1; and, Γ̂i,iu∗i +
∑
j 6=i Γ̂i,ju
∗
j = bˆi, for i ∈ N2.
Substitute the expression for u∗i into ei(n+1), and we obtain
ei(n+1) = ui(n+1)− u∗i = − 1ai
[∑
j 6=i Γi,j(uj(n)− u∗j )
]
,
for i ∈ N1; and ei(n + 1) = ui(n + 1) − u∗i =
1
1−Γi,iγi
[∑
j 6=i Γi,jγi(uj(n)− u∗j)
]
, for i ∈ N2. Let e =
[ei(n)], i ∈ N . Therefore, for i ∈ N1,
|ei(n+ 1)| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1ai
 ∑
j 6=i,j∈N
Γi,j(ej(n))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (25)
≤ 1
ai
∑
j 6=i,j∈N
Γi,j max
j∈N
|ej(n)| (26)
≤ 1
ai
∑
j 6=i,j∈N
Γi,j‖e(n)‖∞. (27)
and similarly, for i ∈ N2,
|ei(n+ 1)| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 11− Γi,iγi
 ∑
j 6=i,j∈N
Γi,jγi(ej(n))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ γi|1− Γi,iγi|
∑
j 6=i,j∈N
Γi,j max
j∈N
|ej(n)|.(28)
≤ γi|1− Γi,iγi|
∑
j 6=i,j∈N
Γi,j‖e(n)‖∞. (29)
Since we assumed that ai >
∑
j 6=i,j∈N Γi,j and γi is chosen
such that γi < 1∑
j∈N
Γi,j
≤ 1Γi,i , we can conclude that
‖e(n)‖ → 0 from the contraction mapping theorem. As a
result, we have ui(n)→ u∗i as n→∞, for i ∈ N .
Remark 4.1: From the proof, we note that the rate of
convergence of is determined by
σ = max
{
max
i∈N1
∑
j 6=i,j∈N Γi,j
ai
,max
i∈N2
∑
j 6=i,j∈N Γi,jγi
1− Γi,iγi
}
.
In addition, it is easy to observe that the OSNR target-seeking
users are algorithmically equivalent to competition seeking
users by letting βi/αi = 0 and ai = Γi,i − 1γi , i ∈ N2.
This is because no notion of pricing is used for the OSNR
target seekers and they just have a utility target to meet or
equivalently optimize by letting ai = Γi,i − 1γi .
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we illustrate the concept by a MATLAB sim-
ulation. We consider an end-to-end link described in Figure 1
with 5 amplified spans. We assume channels are transmitted at
wavelengths distributed centered around 1555nm with channel
separation of 1nm. Suppose input noise power is 0.5 percent
of the input signal power. The gain profile for each amplifier
is identically assumed to be parabolic as in Figure 4, which
is normalized with respect to Gmax = 30.0dB. Suppose 20dB
is the target OSNR level for users who just want to meet a
satisfactory level of transmission. We first show the case of 3
users, in which 2 users need better quality of service and one
user is simply interested in meeting 20dB as a target. From
Figure 5, we can observe that users who need better services
reach an OSNR of 26.33dB and 29.20dB, respectively. With an
appropriate choice of initial conditions, the algorithm quickly
converges in 1-2 steps. In Figure 6, we similarly show the case
of 30 users, in which 20 are game players and 10 are target
seekers.
6Fig. 4. Optical Amplifier Spectral Profile
Fig. 5. OSNR simulation with 3 users in time steps
Fig. 6. OSNR simulation with 30 users in time steps
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examined a generalized power control
model in optical networks, which combines features of central
cost approach and game-theoretical approach. It enables two
major service types in the network. One is game player, who
pays for his power consumption and the other is target seeker,
who is satisfied with a minimum service level set by the
network. We discussed two different solutions concepts for
nonempty and empty feasible set respectively and specifically
designed an iterative algorithm that converges to a unique
solution for the case of nonempty feasible set. The conver-
gence of the algorithm was proved and illustrated by numerical
examples of a WDM end-to-end optical link.
In this work, we didn’t include capacity constraints for the
sake of simplicity. We hope this work will lead to future inves-
tigations of more complicated cases where network constraints
and nonlinear effects are considered. In addition, we expect
this framework to be used to solve similar problems in other
types of networks, for example, wireless networks.
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